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Abstract This paper attempts to explore issues related to right to
information (RTI) and RTI laws, in the context of local governance. The
paper focuses on four case studies—namely, India, Indonesia, Uganda, and
Nicaragua—to highlight some of the complexities in campaigning for RTI
laws and in implementing them. Based on these, a framework is developed
as a tool to map alternative approaches to making local governance more
effective and accountable. At present, there are two schools of thought: one
focusing on supply-led or state-led mechanisms such as public expenditure
tracking surveys, and the other focusing on a human rights-based approach
with RTI law at its centre. The framework developed here suggests that
these alternative approaches need not be considered mutually exclusive
approaches but can be seen in terms of Dreze and Sen’s argument of
democratic institutions and democratic practice. Thus, activists can choose
approaches that best suit a context at a given point in time as intermediate
steps in the journey towards developing just and inclusive institutions.
Key words: Decentralization, Right to information, Local governance,
Accountability
Introduction
A citizen seeking access to information is much like Kannagi in the ancient
Tamil epic seeking justice at the court of Pandyan king for the wrongful
execution of her husband. In that event, Kannagi had to break open her own
silver anklet to reveal the rubies inside as proof that the anklet her husband
was trying to sell was their own and not that of the queen whose anklet had
pearls inside it and not rubies.
If human rights and development are ‘ships passing in the night’
(Alston, 2005), the right to information (RTI) is a searchlight on one ship
that enables the crew of the other ship to examine the health of their
vessel. A human right to information is implied by Article 19 of the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights, and by Article 19 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which refer to the ‘freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds’. The scope for
synergy between human rights and human development is well recognized
(Hijab, 2000; Alston and Robinson, 2005; Alston, 2005; Fukuda-Parr, 2009).
While activists of human rights-based approaches (HRBAs) tend to focus on
making legal claims and seek judicial intervention and legal remedies, Sen
(2004, p. 319) reminds us that human rights are ethical demands and they
are not ‘… principally legal, proto-legal or ideal-legal commands’. Further,
Sen (2005) points out that human rights and capabilities have many things
in common but they differ in distinct ways. Human rights are rights to
particular freedoms and capabilities are freedoms of particular kinds. Sen
(2005, 2009) alludes to the distinction using the concepts of opportunity
and process aspects of freedoms.
In Sen’s writings, the objective of development is expanding substantive
freedoms (Sen, 1999, 2009). Capabilities are the entire range of freedoms that
a person can be or do. Sen (1985, 1992) distinguishes between well-being
aspect and agency aspect of freedoms. ‘A person’s agency achievement refers
to the realisation of goals and values she has reasons to pursue whether or
not they are connected with her own well-being’ (Sen, 1992, p. 56). RTI can
be considered instrumental to the exercise of agency (although it is also
instrumental to the achievement of some of the well-being freedoms). Dreze
and Sen (1995, p. 14) identify five distinct ways in which education and
health can be valuable. Of these, at least three—namely, instrumental social
roles, instrumental process roles, and empowerment and distributive roles—
are applicable to access to information as well.
The remarkable campaign for access to information signified by the
grassroots organization Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sanghatan (MKSS) in the west-
ern Indian state of Rajasthan pre-dated a wave of freedom of information
laws in Europe and elsewhere.1 This campaign especially highlights the
instrumental process role and empowerment role of access to information
such as muster rolls, wage bills and vouchers. As Dreze and Sen (2002,
p. 352) noted, while strengthening democratic institutions (which includes
clarifying various rights including RTI) is important, it is equally important
to distinguish democratic practice from institutions and recognize the role
of innovative campaigns such as those led by MKSS contributing to such
practice.
Against this background, this paper aims to address three questions:
where a statutory RTI does not exist, should non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and activists campaign for such a right? Or are there mechanisms
through which they can improve access to information and to the effective-
ness of local public services even without a statutory RTI? Where a RTI law
has been promulgated, what could activists do to make it more effective? We
begin with a brief overview of human rights and local governance in the next
section. This is followed by a discussion of case studies of local governance
and attempts to use a right to information law. Based on these, in the fourth
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
B
r
a
d
f
o
r
d
]
 
A
t
:
 
2
2
:
3
8
 
2
4
 
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
1
1
Right to Information and Local Governance
137
section a framework is developed for NGOs and civil society institutions to
consider alternative courses of action to obtain information and to make local
government institutions more accountable and effective. In the final section,
some issues for further research are identified.
Human rights and local governance
During the past two decades, issues of institutions and governance have
moved to the centre of discussions concerning economic development
(see North, 1990; Rodrik et al., 2004 ; Acemoglu, 2008; Helpman, 2008).
However, the various approaches and strategies to improving governance
can be broadly classified into two groups, namely: top-down, state-led (or
supply side) interventions; and participatory (demand led) and person-
centred interventions (Ackerman, 2005). The work of organizations such as
Transparency International has no doubt contributed to raising awareness
about corruption issues. However, such cross-country comparisons could
encourage countries to prioritize reducing hurdles to ‘doing business’ and
focusing on changing ‘corruption perception’ of international stakeholders
while doing nothing to alleviate the problems of mis-governance that affect
the ordinary citizens. Top-down or ‘single agency’ and ‘vertical accountabil-
ity’ interventions such as national anti-corruption commissions are no doubt
necessary. However, they are ineffective in addressing widespread corrup-
tion and lack of accountability in delivering local public services (see
Heilbrunn, 2004; Doig et al., 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; United
Nations Development Programme, 2008, ch. 6).
Parallel to the development of the ‘top-down’ institutional measures to
improve governance, right to information issues came to prominence along
with other participatory and ‘horizontal’ accountability mechanisms. Perhaps
the most important, although not the only, mechanism, for realizing the
human right to information is a right to information law. Although the earliest
freedom of information law was passed in Sweden in 1766, only 13 countries
had right to information legislation as of 1990. Even when freedom of infor-
mation came to be emphasized, during the initial phases, the emphasis was
mainly on freedom of information to journalists and media and for data
protection issues in relation to storing of information on computers.
However, the focus has since changed to broader aspects of citizens’ right to
know and over 80 countries have promulgated right to information laws by
2009 (Mendel, 2009). Although discussions of HRBAs are relevant to RTI,
only, in the past two decades RTI law has emerged as a crucial element of
HRBAs and efforts to secure empowerment of citizens and making govern-
ment accountable. In this context, RTI can also be considered a meta-right as
something that leads to better protection and enjoyment of other rights
(Sengupta, 2009).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international
instruments do not necessarily identify the specific role of local government.
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The word ‘state’ is used in its broadest sense to mean all levels of government
and therefore, all responsibilities, duties of care and commitment to justice
that apply to higher levels of government also apply to local government.
Viewing local governance through a human rights lens requires a shift in
perspective form one of ‘service delivery’ to consumers to one of agency (of
citizens) and a recognition that the purpose of local government is to meet
the obligations as duty-bearer on behalf of all citizens who are the right-hold-
ers (International Council on Human Rights, 2005, pp. 22–23).
While HRBAs are not the magic bullet to resolve dysfunctional institu-
tions, they can help provide for person-centred remedies. A few examples
may be useful to highlight the role of human rights in local governance
issues. What may appear to be purely technical aspects of governance, such
as planning regulations or urban development projects, can in fact involve
issues related to some of the most fundamental human rights as was high-
lighted in the famous Indian case of Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal
Corporation in the Supreme Court of India (1985). In that case, the action
of Municipal Corporation to clear slums on the pavements of Bombay and
eviction of such slum dwellers (without providing alternative accommoda-
tion) was challenged as being unreasonable and unjust. The Justices of the
five-member bench emphasized that for the urban poor, living in a particu-
lar location in a city, is the only instrument of livelihood and the denial of
that right to livelihood is tantamount to denial of their right to life. Another
example of a controversy with regard to human rights and sub-national or
local governance concerns public funding for Roman Catholic religious
schools but no other religious groups in Ontario, Canada, notwithstanding
the United Nations Human Rights Committee decision in 1999 that this was
discrimination (United Nations Development Programme, 2000; Allison,
2007).
Where local government action or inaction is interpreted in the context
of human rights, remedial measures have been sought through public interest
litigation. Examples include M.C. Mehta v Union of India (concerning urban
air pollution in Delhi) and various others where right to life is interpreted
widely to encompass a right to healthy environment (see Rao, 2004;
Muralidhar and Desai, 2000).
The above examples suggest that where human rights protections exist
in national law, it may be possible to improve local governance through legal
reviews. However, a legal remedy is only a small and a minor part of a human
rights perspective. As the UN Office of the Human Rights Commissioner
(n.d.) emphasized: 
The true test of ‘good’ governance is the degree to which it delivers
on the promise of human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political
and social rights. The key question is: are the institutions of gover-
nance effectively guaranteeing the right to health, adequate hous-
ing, sufficient food, quality education, fair justice and personal
security?
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Case studies on using access to information with or without 
formal RTI laws
The methodology for this study includes analysis of secondary sources of
information as well as semi-structured questionnaire surveys with selected
programme officers of Oxfam GB and its affiliates in a number of countries.
The four case studies reported here are selected to highlight divergences in
local government institutions and the potential role of RTI.
India
In the federal structure of India, until 1992, local governance was entirely
subject to the whims of state governments. This changed when the 73rd and
74th constitutional amendments in 1992 laid out a clear framework for the
governance of local institutions in rural and urban areas, respectively. These
amendments also provided for independent election commissions to conduct
elections to the local government institutions and a state finance commission
to provide transparent frameworks for transfer of funds from state govern-
ment to local government. However, while all states implemented the
mandatory aspects of the amendments, there has been considerable variation
in the effectiveness of implementation. As Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000,
2006) argue, corruption can actually increase with decentralization due to
increased scope for elite capture, distributed nature of institutions and the
significant transaction costs in monitoring public spending. Two alternative
approaches to improving accountability of local government institutions
became prominent. Samuel Paul (1994, 2002) and colleagues at the Public
Affairs Centre used surveys to collect information about quality of service in
the delivery of various public services and used these ‘citizen scorecards’ to
highlight governance problems. This approach is akin to the ‘new public
management’ approaches and Weberian reforms in the UK, Canada and
elsewhere focusing on creating a customer orientation in public service orga-
nizations (see Hood and Heald, 2006; Guy Peters and Pierre, 2007; Ferlie
et al., 2007).
An alternative approach was to press for a right to information law. The
work of MKSS has been well documented and researched (see Roy and Dey,
2001; Mishra, 2003). The campaign initially started with a limited purpose of
accessing information in relation to wages that landless labourers were
supposed to have been paid for public works that are a common feature of
drought relief and famine relief measures in Rajasthan. A number of public
hearings or jan sunwais were arranged in 1994 and 1995 whereby copies of
official documents concerning development works revealed the extent of
diversion or mis-appropriation of such resources. Subsequently, a ‘sit-in’
demonstration by the MKSS activists led the chief minister to give a verbal
assurance in the state legislature that government supports people’s right to
have access to information. However, this verbal assurance was largely
ignored and the demand for a right to information law continued for several
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years. Several state governments such as Tamil Nadu, Goa and Madhya
Pradesh started to introduce state laws during the period 1997–2000. Even-
tually, Indian Parliament passed the national right to information act in 2005.
This law requires all public authorities to provide ‘… as much information
suo motu’ at regular and periodic intervals using all media including the
Internet. In every authority, a public information officer (PIO) needs to be
designated. Such PIOs have the duty to deal with requests from any person
for information. Any person can make a request in writing asking for informa-
tion. When a request is received, the PIO is obliged to accept the application
and provide the information or reject the application if the information
sought relates to exclusions mentioned in Sections 8 and 9 of the Act. These
include considerations such as sovereignty or national security or specific
legal judgements forbidding disclosure or issues related to intellectual prop-
erty, fiduciary confidentiality and personal safety. The act also provides for
central and state information commissions, the appointment of information
commissioners and for any person to complain to such information commis-
sioners if they are unable to obtain any information from the PIO.
When governments use scorecard methods or surveys such as public
expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) as a mechanism to improve perfor-
mance, the resulting commitment to accountability is arbitrary (and not
formalized). Also, the relationship is cast as that between a consumer and
service provider. Used in this manner, such tools can militate against ethos
of right to information rather than strengthening it. The main difference is
that in the campaign on RTI law, the relationship is that between state and
citizen and the RTI law clarifies an obligation on the part of the state to
provide information (in the wider context of Article 19 of Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights). Scorecard or survey methods can be used within
a context of rights to complement to RTI law or to facilitate the exercise of
RTI law.
Has the RTI law helped in improving local governance? It is probably
early days. However, evidence from grassroots organizations suggests that
the RTI law has contributed to empowering citizens or grassroots organiza-
tions to demand accountability from government at all levels. For example,
an organization called ‘the Fifth Pillar’ in southern Indian state of Tamil
Nadu seeks to educate various volunteers to use RTI to enforce greater
accountability in public services. The MKSS-inspired ‘social audits’ or public
hearings whereby the accounts of local government institutions are exam-
ined and discussed during public gatherings are now being used in other
states such as Delhi (by Parivartan), Andhra Pradesh (Aakella and Kidambi,
2007) and in Kerala by the state information commission. These examples
suggest that the role of civil society organizations has been crucial. A study
by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (2009, p. 27) noted: 
Civil Society Organizations and social activists are enhancing the
reach and awareness of RTI among the masses. It is mostly with the
support of the social activists and Civil Society Organizations that a
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person in a village is able to use the RTI Act for ensuring his basic
rights. However given the geographical size & population, the
reach of Civil Society Organizations and social activists is limited.
While the Constitution’s 73rd and 74th amendments provided for constitu-
tional protections to local government institutions, those measures did not
anticipate or provide for controlling corruption and institutional capture.
Although the constitutional amendments provided for much-needed and
‘necessary’ conditions for improving local governance, these were not suffi-
cient to guarantee that people can exercise their agency and take part in deci-
sion-making processes concerning services from local government. Perhaps
the RTI law would not have been effective in the absence of the Constitution
amendments. Also, well before RTI law came into effect, there was already
well-established precedence of judicial activism. The Supreme Court and the
High Courts have used human rights arguments to intervene in or direct
government policy.
Indonesia
It appears that the tumultuous political and economic events2 of 1997–1998
may have contributed to a ‘big bang’ form of decentralization introduced in
Indonesia by Laws 22 (local autonomy) and 25 drafted in 1999 and intro-
duced in 2001. This law has been revised in by Law 32 of 2004 (regional
governance). At sub-national level, various layers exist, such as provincial,
regency, city, district, sub-district, and village (with further two types: desa
and kelurahan). Among other things, there is a transition from ‘traditional’
and appointed positions of authority to elected offices as the 2004 law
provides for elected head of local government. Hofman and Kaiser (2006,
p. 113) are of the opinion that ‘… a range of accountability mechanisms
(including elections, central oversight, and judicial sanction) will need to be
strengthened given the initial conditions of governance and service delivery
underlying Indonesia’s decentralisation’.
Local governance is a complex matter in any context and more so in
a context as in Indonesia that is undergoing transition in terms of social, polit-
ical, and economic factors. According to the Governance Matters database
(Kaufman et al., 2007), Indonesia has remained in the bottom 25% of countries
in control of corruption throughout the past decade. According to Transpar-
ency International’s (2007) Global Corruption Barometer, 31% of respondents
reported to have paid a bribe. On a scale of one to five where one is least
corrupt and five is most corrupt, only three institutions of social and political
life—namely, religious bodies, media, and NGOs—have scored less than three;
many others including political, legal, and service providing institutions scored
above four. Corruption perception can create self-fulfilling prophecy. In such
a context, increasing citizens’ trust in state institutions would remain a signif-
icant challenge. Corruption is not the only issue with regard to improving
governance in general, and local governance in particular. However, the issues
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
B
r
a
d
f
o
r
d
]
 
A
t
:
 
2
2
:
3
8
 
2
4
 
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
 
2
0
1
1
P. B. Anand
142
are symptomatic of underlying institutional challenges. These can be partic-
ularly constraining for NGOs to work on ‘supply’ side and work with state
institutions when NGOs are perceived to be less corrupt and state institutions
are perceived to be more corrupt.
After much campaigning by local activists, the Openness of Public
Information Act was passed by federal government in 2008 but came into
effect only from April 2010. Although it has many similar features to the
Indian RTI act, the following crucial differences set them apart: 
a. The person requesting information needs to justify or provide reasons in
Indonesian law. (This is not the case in Indian law.)
b. The law excludes some aspects of state owned enterprises and also
private organizations that may be implementing projects on behalf of
government. (Indian act does not have these exclusions.)
c. The Indonesian law also applies to NGOs that receive substantial funds
from overseas.
While it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of RTI legislation in
Indonesia, NGOs and civil society institutions have been using HRBAs in
terms of participatory assessments.
A recent project of Oxfam called ‘Driving Change’ was aimed at making
government policies and budgets more pro-poor. Among other things, the
project focused on improving public service delivery at district and national
levels and also on local development planning. However, there appears to
have been some resistance from some civil servants and (regional/local)
parliament members with regard to the participatory and rights-based
approach used in the project. In response to our questionnaire, colleagues
working with an NGO in Indonesia commented that, even as institutions are
emerging, local government is vulnerable to ‘… re-emerging form of author-
itarianism … [especially due to] a lack of local parliament’s capacity to
control and monitor formal governance practices’. They felt that the issue
needs to be addressed both from ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ sides and the deficits
of representative mechanisms need to be addressed through various mecha-
nisms and instruments of ‘direct/deliberative democracy’, especially for the
voices of the poor to be heard and to make local government responsive to
those needs. This relates to the issue of not merely strengthening democratic
institutions but finding ways to improve democratic practice.
Uganda
Under the framework of Uganda’s 1995 constitution, the Local Government
Act of 1997 provides a framework for local government with five layers;
namely, village, parish, sub-county, county, and district. According to the
policy statement of the Ministry of Local Government (2007): 
… The decentralisation policy has transformed the local gover-
nance landscape in this country. Today, every local government is
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able to: initiate, formulate and approve budgets and development
plans; provide social services to the people; legislate on issues
which are local in nature; appoint its own civil servants, supervise
and monitor their performance.
There is also some evidence to suggest that with the decentralization
reforms, an increased share of government resources are transferred to local
government.
However, critics may argue that this is an optimistic assessment and that
governments are unlikely to be critical and open about their own function-
ing. For instance, Francis and James’ (2003) observation cited by Robinson
(2007, p. 11) suggests an alternative assessment: 
… Decentralisation has not been able to arrest the deterioration in
agricultural services, and that the improvements in social services
are attributable to increases in central conditional funding rather
than the very limited scope which decentralised institutions have
provided for local decision making.
Among the many interesting observations in Azfar et al. (2006, pp. 238–
239) about Uganda, two points may be highlighted: that ‘… people who used
community leaders as their main source of information on local politics were
significantly less likely to have heard of reports of corruption … than people
who rely on media as their main source of information’;3 and that education
and income predicted which individuals participated in local committees
such as education committee and health committee (although such ‘elite’
capture of local committees also led to improved services). The former high-
lights the importance of understanding traditional sources of power and the
latter emphasizes the need to anticipate the role of educated individuals and
create opportunities to co-opt such individuals to be champions of rights-
based programming in local governance.
According to responses from development workers to our questionnaire
in this research, local government units in Uganda lack tax-raising powers
and depend mainly on handouts from national government. Improving finan-
cial integrity of local government may be crucial to improving the nature of
participation by local citizens.
Ugandan constitution provides for freedom of information. The access
to information act was passed in 2005 and came into effect in 2006. As per
section 5 of the act, every citizen has the right of access to information. As in
Indian law, here too a person’s access to information is not affected by the
reasons for requesting such access or an information officer’s assessment of
why the citizen may be seeking such information. The act includes a long list
of exclusions where the access to information request can be rejected.
Unlike in Indian law, in the Ugandan law no central focal point (such as infor-
mation commission) is provided for. Each minister is supposed to report
annually on the number of access to information requests. At the time of
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writing, no information was available on the government websites on the
number of such requests and how the act is being implemented.
Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Human Development Index of 0.699 in 2007 places it amongst
medium human development countries. However, poverty is widespread and
Nicaragua’s human poverty index is 17%, which is significantly higher than
that of Bolivia (11.6%) or Honduras (13.7%). As in most countries in Latin
America, inequality is a major development challenge in Nicaragua too.
Poverty is concentrated especially among some regions such as the
Caribbean coast and in the rural areas. More than 58% of population lives in
urban areas in some 189 urban localities and some 7500 dispersed rural
communities (World Bank, 2008). One of the reasons for discussion on
accountability issues is that there is a formal law requiring a transfer of
resources from national to local government without the necessary mecha-
nisms to ensure that such funds are properly used. The Municipal Transfer
Payments Act of 2003 provided for four percentage points of tax revenue to
be transferred to municipalities starting in 2004, gradually increasing by one
percentage point each year until reaching 10 percentage points by 2010
(Inter-American Development Bank, 2008). The Inter-American Development
Bank report noted that: ‘The institutions responsible for implementing social
policies suffer from serious structural problems, including a shortage of
infrastructure, institutional fragility, weakness in policy formulation and
investment planning, shortcomings in human resources, and scant financial
resources’ (2008). Improving transparency of public spending has been
considered a priority.
Although Nicaragua’s constitution did not provide for a right to informa-
tion, the RTI act introduced in 2007 provides for comprehensive measures to
ensure citizens’ access to information (Mendel, 2009). However, we do not
have any information to evaluate whether and to what extent RTI law has
been effective in Nicaragua.
In the response to the questionnaire, Nicaragua colleagues pointed to
some current projects to support democratic governance in Nicaragua,
which are aimed at realizing right to information. Two issues have been high-
lighted in that response: first that the responsibility for local government has
shifted to the Instituto Nicaraguense de Fomento Municipal from the govern-
ment; second that even though local government now has more resources
than it did 10 years ago, their capacity is very limited and there is limited
scope for improving accountability under the current regime. This observa-
tion echoes with other studies (Anderson, 2006). A conclusion of a study of
public administration in Latin America (Nef, 2007, p. 332) seems relevant
here: 
… Historically, the administrative experience of Latin America has
been molded by numerous failed attempts at modernisation and
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cyclical crises. This results in a protracted condition of institutional
under-development … Without political and institutional develop-
ment, addressing real issues such as poverty, unemployment or lack
of effective citizenship … are mere epiphenomena.
A similar negative tone is noticed in a study of human rights ombudsman
institutions in El Salvador and Guatemala, where widespread corruption and
capture of judicial institutions necessitated the setting up of ombudsman
institutions (Dodson and Jackson, 2004). In contrast to these, an optimistic
conclusion is reached by Faguet (2006, p. 147) with regard to success of
decentralization in Bolivia. He concludes: 
… Detailed empirical evidence shows that decentralisation made
public investment more responsive to the real local needs of
Bolivia’s citizens and shifted resources toward poorer, mostly rural
districts. (Faguet, 2006, p. 147)
It appears that there is no formal RTI law in Bolivia comparable with
RTIs discussed here. However, it appears that political mobilization and more
effective participation contributed to more effective use of existing provi-
sions in Bolivia for demanding accountability than in the case of Nicaragua.
This suggests the important role of political leadership. These experiences
seem to indicate that in Nicaragua and elsewhere, creating a RTI is but a first
step in improving local governance.
Learning from the cases: towards a framework
Issues related to local governance are complex and there is considerable vari-
ation from one country to another in the level or degree to which right to
information is defined and clarified. The four case studies are mere examples
of these variations and complex interactions. Many complexities and local
realities are difficult to capture within the research methods I have used.
However, from these experiences (and others not discussed here) it is possi-
ble to develop a model or a framework. The framework proposed here is not
a substitute for grounded and context-based analysis. It is developed as a tool
to recognize the dynamic nature of development of a RTI law and taking the
process of creating such a statuary right to its logical conclusion whereby the
values of openness and transparency become embedded in the culture of
institutions and become second nature (so that a citizen does not need to
take recourse to legal remedies).
For simplicity, let us consider two dimensions: one of formalizing a right
to information, and the other of effectiveness using information for account-
ability. Figure 1 shows this two-dimensional space in the form of a rectangle.
FIGURE 1. A formal right to information and making access to information effective.
For simplicity, let us consider the starting point to be the bottom left-
hand corner. (The label ‘autocracy’ applies only to the information regime
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and not to the nature of polity.) Prior to the RTI law, the information access
regime can be described as autocratic even in a democratic society such as
India. Movement along the horizontal axis from left to right suggests a greater
degree of formal articulation of right to information; movement along the
vertical axis suggests a greater degree of effectiveness in using access to infor-
mation to hold government to account. In relation to Dreze and Sen’s (2002)
arguments mentioned earlier, we can consider horizontal movement as
improving democratic institutions and vertical movement as improving
democratic practice. Theoretically, it is possible that local governance insti-
tutions can be very effective in understanding and delivering the services that
people want even without a formal RTI (‘arbitrary accountability’). It is also
possible that no matter how well RTI is articulated (no pun is intended) or
how well the law has been drafted, by itself, it may not be adequate to
improving governance (hence ‘right on paper’ but not in reality).
FIGURE 1. A formal right to information and making access to information effective.
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Civil society institutions or activists have various pathways and different
roles to play in different contexts. Where a formal RTI law is essential to secur-
ing agency freedoms of individuals and improving the effectiveness of gover-
nance, then the priority should be to campaign for a formal RTI (or movement
along horizontal axis). It may also be effective to campaign for a formal RTI
if political or economic circumstances have led to ‘big-bang’ style reforms
such as the drafting of a new constitution in South Africa or new municipal
laws as in India or Indonesia. The case studies discussed in the previous
section indicate that campaigns for RTI laws can take a long time to succeed.
In many contexts, notwithstanding a commitment to HRBAs, institutions
and activists may need to take a pragmatic approach of demanding RTI laws
in the long term but trying to find ways to improve governance using other
mechanisms ways of obtaining information in the short term (i.e. movement
along vertical axis). Approaches such as citizen scorecards, PETS, participa-
tory budgeting exercises can be considered here. The MKSS experience seems
to suggest that, based on successful demonstration of such approaches, solid
grassroots support can be developed for articulation of a demand for RTI law
(and thus subsequent movement from the top left corner to the top right
corner in Figure 1).
What is new in this framework? This framework is helpful in placing
both supply-led and demand-led approaches to local governance within the
context of HRBAs. It shows that these are not mutually exclusive alternatives.
The framework also suggests that civil society institutions or activists in a
given context can assess their context and choose from a range of strategies
and decide how to allocate effort towards campaigns for formal articulation
of RTI laws and towards other approaches to obtaining information and
improving opportunities for participation and public or social audits even
when formal statuary rights do not yet exist.
In the framework above, the evolution of MKSS appears to have
proceeded along the vertical axis in the first instance from 1990 to 1995
(bottom left to top left) and then in the second stage from 1995 onwards in
terms of a campaign for a formal RTI law (along the horizontal axis from top
left to top right). On the other hand, the work of organizations such as the
Fifth Pillar seems to have started from the bottom right-hand corner to move
vertically to top right.
In the cases of Indonesia, Uganda and Nicaragua, promulgation of RTI
laws may have contributed to a movement along the horizontal axis. However,
whether RTI law has resulted in any effective and lasting improvement in
governance depends very much on how well the law itself is implemented
and how democratic practice and participation demands accountability from
state institutions.
Conclusion
Human rights laws can be considered ‘formal’ constraints on behaviour and
are part of an institutional landscape of a society. However, as North (2003)
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points out, the effectiveness of institutions depends on how well the formal
constraints match with the informal constraints such as contextual and
cultural norms and codes of behaviour. There is a tendency to perceive decen-
tralization to be an efficient mode of delivery of services from administrative
or financial viewpoints. Devolution is ultimately about the freedoms of indi-
vidual citizens and how well these are protected. A right to information law
can be a useful tool to make local government accountable to such poor men
and women. However, an ‘all or nothing’ approach to RTI can be misleading
in two ways: first, the emphasis shifts to creating a formal legislation without
creating the necessary ‘duty bearers’; second, once the RTI law is promul-
gated, it can lead to complacency. The framework developed here highlights
that formal law may be necessary but not sufficient. Both formal and informal
mechanisms can be used by NGOs and communities to hold local government
institutions to account. NGOs and grass-root organizations in some contexts
can achieve more in holding local government to account through participa-
tory or community-based audits and public deliberation of budgets rather than
waiting for a formal RTI to be introduced. Likewise, such approaches need
not be abandoned as soon as RTI law is promulgated. In fact, such approaches
may be crucial to make RTI law work for the ideals that led to its creation in
the first place. While the non-payment of wages to workers motivated MKSS
in its first stage, even after RTI law has been promulgated and a rights-based
employment act—the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)—
has been introduced, the problems of contract-farming and diversion of
resources seem to have continued elsewhere in states such as Orissa (see
Dreze, 2007). Corruption and problems of governance are important hurdles
to development in all four case-study countries discussed here. However, the
case studies also highlight that while making local government institutions
accountable is a complex process, a rights-based approach in general, and RTI
law in particular, can contribute to clarifying accountability.
It is important to distinguish between the legal obligations placed by a
RTI law on a state versus the moral obligations underlying such RTI laws.
RTI laws can be considered to have been effective only when their influence
results in transforming the culture of local government institutions from
‘right on paper’ providers of information to inclusive institutions promoting
and protecting citizens’ right to participate in governance. This requires
improving ‘formal’ institutions such as RTI laws, clarifying the locus of
general and specific obligations4 in terms of relationship between citizens
and local government, and acting as an arbiter or guardian of citizen interests
in terms of relationship between citizen and other (market) institutions.
There is considerable work to be done by non-governmental organizations
and civil society institutions to use RTI laws to achieve such transformation.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that RTI law is one side of a
coin that will remain incomplete without necessary measures for data
protection and privacy issues (see O’Neill, 2002, p. 92). There is a danger
that a single-minded emphasis on RTI law may hasten the process of articu-
lating RTI without the necessary institutional architecture for regulating and
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governing information access. There is also a need for further discussion on
developing information regulation regimes appropriate to the given
contexts. There is an urgent need to find ways to balance the requirements
of RTI with restraints that the state institutions may want to impose on the
grounds of public order and safety. At the moment, these two aspects
appear to be evolving independently. We can foresee the risks this diver-
gence presents in terms of the scope for state institutions to negate or
counter the moral arguments underlying RTI laws with claims of terrorist or
security threats.
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Notes
1 Looking back at the introduction of Freedom of Information Act in the UK in 2000, former
Prime Minister Tony Blair (2010) comments in his memoirs that he might have been naive
to introduce such a law. When seen against this, the MKSS campaign in 1994–1995
appears well ahead of its time.
2 The East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998, protests and Suharto resignation in May
1998.
3 Azfar et al. (2006) point out that in Uganda there is a significant difference in the sources
of information for national elections and local elections. For the former, national radio and
local radio are the main sources (being used by up to 65% respondents) whereas these are
reported to be sources of information by less than 20% when it concerns local elections.
For such elections, the main source of information for over 70% of respondents was
‘community leaders’.
4 On the nature of general and special obligations and some possible problems related to
these, see Wringe (2005).
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